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 Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
Abstract  
Matched employer-employee data research has found that workers’ wages are affected 
by the characteristics of the firms they work in, and that higher skilled workers tend to 
be employed by higher paying firms. This paper examines the contribution of workers’ 
job mobility to their wage dynamics. We focus on the possible trade-off between moving 
to a better paying firm and losing a firm-tenure specific component of earnings, and 
examine what types of workers benefit from changing firms, rather than staying with 
their existing employer.  
Our analysis provides four main findings. First, although the raw earnings gains to job-
movers and stayers are about the same, we find that, after controlling for observable 
differences, job-movers have about 1.3 percent lower annual earnings growth than non-
movers. Second, we estimate that job-movers gain 0.3 percent per year on average 
from moving to higher paying firms, but lose 1.6 percent in transitory earnings 
associated with changing jobs. The gains from moving to better firms are larger for both 
younger and new entrant workers, while the transitory earnings losses are smaller. We 
interpret these findings as being due to an earnings growth trade-off for workers 
between moving to a higher paying firm and losing their tenure-related earnings at their 
existing firm. 
Third, we estimate that, on average, workers gain (almost) all of the change in firm 
earnings premiums when they change jobs. However, such gains are not equally 
shared by all workers. In particular, our estimates suggest that it is the higher ability 
workers (as measured by the estimated worker earnings premiums) whose earnings 
gain (or lose) the most from moving to a firm with higher (or lower) earnings premiums. 
Finally, we find that workers’ earnings also benefit on average from a change in the 
average earnings of their co-workers. Controlling for other factors, we estimate that a 1 
standard deviation change in the estimated average peer earnings is associated with 
about 0.25 percent change in a worker’s earnings on average. 
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1.  Introduction 
Workers can expect wage changes to be related to their experience, for a given set of 
human capital characteristics. In addition, workers who remain in their jobs may expect 
wage gains related to their job-tenure at the firm. In contrast, workers who change jobs 
will lose their accumulated tenure premium but may increase their wage if they move to 
a higher paying firm or find a better firm-match. 
In this paper, we provide a preliminary analysis of the relationship between workers’ job 
mobility and wage dynamics in New Zealand, and investigate the influence of firm 
characteristics on the size of wage gains experienced by job-movers.
1 Employers differ 
in their human resource practices and pay structures, yet much of the literature on wage 
dynamics relies largely on panel studies of workers, and has been unable to identify 
whether wage changes for job-movers depend on or are related to the change in 
characteristics of their employer. 
Our analysis uses Statistics New Zealand’s Linked Employer-Employee Database 
(LEED), which provides longitudinal employment and earnings data on individual 
workers, together with information on the firms that they work for. Such linked data 
facilitate the analysis of the contribution of firm characteristics to workers’ wages and 
wage variability. Applying methods developed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) 
and Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002), research has found that workers’ wages are 
affected by their firms’ characteristics, and that higher skilled workers tend to be 
employed by higher paying firms.
2 In previous research (Maré and Hyslop, 2006), we 
estimated that permanent firm differences account for between 10 and 25 percent of the 
variation in workers’ earnings and, also that permanent worker and firm components of 
job earnings are positively correlated. 
We extend our previous analysis of the relationship between worker and firm earnings 
premiums and workers’ earnings levels, and focus on the contribution of workers’ job 
mobility to their earnings dynamics. We begin by estimating indexes of workers’ and 
firms’ earnings premiums, and then examine the evolution of worker earnings as they 
move between firms offering different average premiums. In particular, we examine the 
trade-offs to individual workers between staying with their current employer, and moving 
to a firm with a different earnings premium. We analyse the contribution to earnings 
growth of changes in the estimated firm earnings’ premiums when workers change 
firms. We examine what types of workers benefit more or less from changing firms 
versus staying with their existing employer.
3 However, we also analyse the effects of a 
change in workers’ average peer earnings premiums on workers’ earnings changes. 
In the next section, we briefly discuss some related literature to help place the analysis 
here in context. In section 3, we present our empirical approach and discuss some of 
                                                  
 
1  Our analysis is also related to an earlier study by Maloney (2006), who examined the job 
mobility and earnings patterns of workers in New Zealand using LEED.  
2  For example, Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann and Pérez-Duarte (2004) estimate a negative 
correlation using French data and a small positive correlation in US data. Subsequent 
studies have confirmed and elaborated on their finding that estimated correlations can be 
negatively biased due to low turnover (Andrews et al., 2008; Maré and Hyslop, 2006). 
3  Andersson, Holzer and Lane (2003, 2005) examine earnings dynamics for low-wage 
workers. They analyse the relationship between wage changes and the pay premium of firms 
where they are subsequently employed, and find that “low earners were much more likely to 
increase their earnings if they gained employment at a higher-wage firm”, implying an 
interaction between wage growth and changing firm effects. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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the estimation issues, and section 4 contains a discussion of the LEED data. We 
present and discuss the results in section 5, and the paper concludes with a discussion. 
2.  A brief literature review 
There is an extensive international literature both on job mobility and the related issue of 
the economic returns to firm-specific tenure (or seniority).
4 Job mobility can have two 
offsetting effects on workers’ wages. First, via active job-search by workers and firms, it 
can result in a better match between workers and firms, in terms of job-specific 
productivity, and result in wage increases. Second, any tenure-related productivity and 
wage gains will be destroyed with any job-move. In addition, the wage implications 
associated with a job change depend very much on whether the move is voluntary or 
involuntary on the part of the worker (Gottschalk and Maloney, 1985). On average, 
voluntary “quits” are associated with wage increases, while involuntary “layoffs” are 
associated with wage cuts. Light (2005) reports that workers who change jobs 
experience smaller wage gains than those who stay with their employer, with voluntary 
movers gaining 1.4 percent (men) to 1.7 percent (women) more than movers generally. 
Men who change jobs voluntarily have higher wage growth than non-movers.
5 
Thus, there is a potentially complex relationship between workers’ job mobility and their 
wage dynamics. This is further complicated by the possible endogeneity of workers’ 
decisions to change jobs, and also the empirical magnitude(s) associated with match-
quality and tenure-productivity effects. A number of US studies have used alternative 
methods and approaches to control for the possible endogeneity of job-moves, in 
measuring the contribution of firm-specific tenure to workers’ wages. For example, 
Topel (1986), Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and Altonji and 
Williams (2005) each conclude that the returns to tenure are relatively small; while 
Topel (1991) finds large and significant returns to tenure. Buchinsky et al. (2008) 
provides a recent attempt to unify the literature, using a structural approach that 
explicitly models the individual’s decision to change jobs and their decision to work, as 
well as their wage equation, and conclude that the returns to tenure are significantly 
positive and larger even than Topel’s (1991) estimates. This suggests that there may be 
small to large loss-of-tenure related wage losses associated with changing jobs. 
Empirically, most jobs have short-tenure, but long-tenure jobs are also common (Farber, 
1999).
6 In addition, the job separation hazard rate exhibits negative duration 
dependence, so that longer jobs have a lower probability of ending. While most job 
moves are associated with wage gains, a substantial fraction (20–40 percent) of moves 
is associated with wage cuts (Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2005). Declining hazard 
rates could be due to either heterogeneity in individual workers’ propensity to change 
jobs, and/or due to state dependence effects, whereby past job-mobility (or lack of it) 
directly affects the probability of separating in the future. 
Linked employer-employee data have been used in a number of recent studies to shed 
further light on the issue of wage dynamics and turnover. Such data enable a clearer 
                                                  
 
4  Farber (1999) provides a useful summary. 
5  Light (2005) reports that 80 to 90 percent of moves are voluntary. New Zealand estimates 
are scarce. Herzog (1996) reports a lower proportion of voluntary moves (half to two-thirds) 
during 1985 to 1994; a period of substantial job loss and structural change. The proportion of 
moves that are voluntary is likely to be higher than this during our study period, when 
employment growth was strong. 
6  Statistics New Zealand (2007) estimates from LEED that 42 percent of jobs at 31 March 
2006 had been ongoing for less than 1 year, while 12 percent had been ongoing for at least 7 
years. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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identification of the interaction of worker turnover and firms’ pay policies, analysing the 
contributions of heterogeneous firms’ pay policies (Abowd, Kramarz and Roux, 2006); 
export opportunities (Kaplan and Verhoogen, 2006); and the process of endogenous 
mobility and matching (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006, Cornellissen and Hübler, 2007, 
Gruetter and Lalive, 2009). At the core of each of these studies is a two-way fixed effect 
model of wage determination, in some cases with additional explicit modeling of tenure 
effects or mobility. There is consistent evidence of a high degree of heterogeneity 
across firms – not only in wage premiums paid, but also in starting wages and tenure 
profiles, with starting wage and within-firm wage growth being inversely related. 
Workers are more likely to leave low-paying firms, consistent with self-selective job 
mobility. Gruetter and Lalive (2009) find that the identity of the firm is a more important 
factor in wage determination when workers are entering from unemployment than when 
they are making more self-selected job-to-job moves. Andersson et al (2003, 2005) 
document the significant influence that firm pay policies have on patterns of wage 
growth for low-earning workers. They find that low earning workers are much more likely 
to increase their pay if they gain employment with a higher-wage firm. 
The only empirical analysis of the relationship between job mobility and wages in New 
Zealand that we are aware of is a recent study using LEED data by Maloney (2006). 
Maloney uses 5 years of monthly data from April 1999 – March 2004 and focuses on 
prime aged (aged 25–54 in April 1999) male workers. He further restricts the analytical 
sample of job-movers to those workers who have at least one year of continuous 
employment with a firm prior to a job move and at least one year of employment with a 
firm after the move. As a comparison group, he selects a sample of job-stayers who 
have at least two years of continuous employment with the same firm over the period. 
Maloney’s analysis then compares the patterns of monthly earnings trends of the job-
movers over the two years around their move and the job-stayers. He first shows that 
job-movers experience, on average, about 0.2 percent higher earnings growth than 
stayers. However, after controlling for age differences of movers and stayers, and 
differences in characteristics such as firm size, average monthly earnings and the 
worker’s tenure and earnings at the start of the first (12-month) period, Maloney finds 
that job-movers earnings fall by 0.3–0.5 percent on average relative to the wages of job-
stayers over the two year period. He also estimates that about one-third of the change 
in the average earnings of workers in the firm(s) a worker is employed by is reflected in 
the worker’s earnings change over the period.
7 
Our analysis in this paper differs from Maloney’s in several dimensions. First, we have a 
longer period of LEED data (9 versus 5 years), focus on annual earnings, and consider 
all workers who have employment in pairs of consecutive years, rather than restricting 
attention to movers who make a single move between stable (one-year or more) jobs.
8 
Second, our earnings measure is an annualised full-time equivalent (FTE) earnings 
rate, which we estimate from monthly data using an algorithm discussed in detail in 
Maré and Hyslop (2006). Third, we incorporate explicit measures of the change in firm’s 
earnings premiums, based on estimates from a two-way (worker and firm) fixed effects 
regression specification, and the worker’s average peer earnings, and examine their 
                                                  
 
7  We interpret that this largely reflects the effect of job-changers moving between firms with 
different pay levels; however, it may be capturing average wage changes within firms, due, 
for example, to worker mobility and/or general earnings adjustments. 
8  We examine the potential influence of impact of the selection criterion by examining a 
subsample of workers who have at most a single job change over our study period. This 
comparison is presented in Table 6 and discussed in section 5.2. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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contributions to worker’s wage changes.
9 We believe this is akin to Maloney’s approach 
of examining the contribution of the change in the firm-average earnings on worker’s 
earnings change, but separated and modelled more explicitly. 
Notwithstanding these differences in sample selection and methodology, our results are 
somewhat larger than those of Maloney. In particular, we also find that job-movers raw 
average earnings gains are slightly larger than those of job-stayers, but that regression-
adjusted movers’ earnings gains are lower than those of stayers. Beyond these results, 
we believe our analysis provides some useful preliminary evidence on the average 
earnings change associated job-match quality versus tenure loss, and what types of 
workers do make earnings gains from moving. 
3.  Empirical approach 
We use a two-stage procedure to estimate the relationship between workers’ earnings 
growth and changing firm characteristics. Following Maré and Hyslop (2006, 2008), we 
first estimate the permanent firm and worker components of log(FTE earnings) across 
all jobs, using two-way fixed effects estimation. Second, we analyse earnings growth for 
workers according to whether they are movers or stayers. In particular, we examine 
variation in the degree to which workers’ earnings growth is related to the changing 
characteristics of the firms in which they are employed and the changing mix of workers 
with whom they work. 
3.1.  Components of earnings rates and change 
In the first stage of our analysis, we estimate an additive log-linear two-way fixed effects 
model for the log(FTE annual earnings) of worker-i, employed in firm-j, in year-t (yijt). We 
regress yijt on a vector of worker-level observable characteristics (Xit), time-invariant 
fixed worker (θi) and firm (ψj) effects, and an idiosyncratic earnings component (εijt): 
  ijt j i it ijt X y ε ψ θ β + + + ′ = . (1) 
The vector Xit consists of sex-specific age-quartics and time-effects; the worker effect θi 
represents the portable earnings premium of worker-i and reflects factors such as their 
ability and motivation; similarly, the firm effect ψj represents the earnings premium paid 
by firm-j to each of their workers and reflects the firm’s pay structure; and the residual 
term εijt = mijt + τijt + υijt, where mijt is a, possibly time-varying, component capturing 
match-quality, τijt captures tenure effects, and υijt is a random idiosyncratic component. 
In the second stage of our analysis we focus on individual worker level earnings and, 
more specifically, year-to-year earnings changes. To facilitate this the data are 
aggregated to worker-year observations, by taking the FTE employment weighted 
average of the workers earnings, and the estimate components from equation (1), 
across all the jobs the worker held during a year. Based on the estimates of equation 
(1), we can express worker-i's earnings rate as,  
  it t i j i it it X y ε ψ θ β ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
), ( + + + ′ =  (1′) 
where a caret (^) denotes an estimate obtained from estimating equation (1), and  t i j ), ( ˆ ψ  
is the average estimated firm effect across all firms that worker-i worked for in year-t. 
Based on equation (1′), the implied year-to-year change in worker-i's earnings rate is 
                                                  
 
9  Note, being a time-invariant ‘fixed-effect’, the change in the firm-effect of job-stayers is, by 
construction, zero. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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  it t i j it it X y ε ψ β ˆ ˆ ˆ
), ( Δ + Δ + ′ Δ = Δ . (2) 
The contributions and interpretations of earnings change are different for movers and 
stayers.
10 The first component captures the effect of changes in individual 
characteristics, in particular, changes in work experience, and is common to both 
movers and stayers. However, the second term, the change in the firm premium 
( t i j ), ( ˆ ψ Δ ) is zero for workers who do not change firms, and reflects the impact of moving 
to a higher- or lower-paying firm for movers. The final term in equation (2),  it ε ˆ Δ , also 
captures different effects for movers and stayers. Assuming match-quality effects are 
time-invariant (mijt = mij) and ignoring idiosyncratic components, for workers who stay 
with the same firm,  it ε ˆ Δ  captures the additional wage growth associated with an 
additional year’s tenure at the firm (Δτijt) plus any idiosyncratic change (Δυijt). In 
contrast, for workers who move from firm-j to firm-k,  it ε ˆ Δ  captures the change in match-
quality associated with the move (mik- mij) less any tenure premium that is lost as a 
result of the move (τijt-1) plus any idiosyncratic change (υikt -υijt). If workers choose to 
move only if the move leads to a higher wage, the sum of these terms is likely to be 
positive for voluntary moves. 
3.2.  Estimation issues 
Equation (1) is estimated on job-level information, with one observation for each 
observed combination of worker, firm and year. This regression is estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) by adapting Abowd, Creecy, Kramarz’s (2002) conjugate gradient 
algorithm using all job-year observations in LEED, weighted by contemporaneous FTE 
employment (see Maré and Hyslop, 2006, 2008 for further details). The OLS estimates 
are unbiased estimates under the assumption of exogenous matching. 
In the presence of tenure and match effects that are correlated with worker and firm 
components,  i θ ˆ  and  j ψ ˆ  will reflect the average match quality and tenure for each 
worker and firm respectively, in addition to the underlying productivity-related 
characteristics.
11 If match and tenure effects are positively correlated with both worker 
and firm components, they will induce a positive correlation between these components. 
We follow the approach of Andersson, Holzer and Lane (2003) and interpret the 
estimated firm and worker components from equation (3) as summary measures of 
worker earning ability and firm pay structures (including average match quality and 
tenure). An alternative approach is to formally model the wage dynamics associated 
with tenure and the process of matching.
12 
                                                  
 
10  Note that, because our second stage analysis focuses on changes in FTE earnings, we thus 
use only the balanced sample of workers who work in each pair of consecutive years. 
11  Similarly, the observable demographic earnings profiles (X′itβ) will also reflect the average 
match quality and tenure effects at different stages of the life cycle. Woodcock (2008) derives 
formulae for the ‘bias’, and implements a random effects identification strategy to obtain 
separate estimates of match effects. 
12  Abowd, Kramarz and Roux (2006) develop an econometric model to study the simultaneous 
determination of worker mobility and wage rates. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) advocate 
the use of matched employer-employee data for the estimation of structural job search 
models. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Assuming the first-stage regression model (1) is correctly specified, the implied 
earnings-change regression, equation (2), has unitary coefficients on  β ˆ
it X′ Δ  and 
t i j ), ( ˆ ψ Δ . However, either non-random selection of the balanced sample of workers with 
consecutive year employment, or lagged FTE employment weighting of our second-
stage change analysis (while the first-stage levels regression is estimated weighted by 
contemporaneous FTE employment), may result in non-unitary coefficients. For these 
reasons, we estimate change regressions of the following form: 
  ( ) it t i j it X it u X y + Δ + ′ Δ = Δ ), ( ˆ . ˆ . ψ λ β λ ψ  (3) 
Also, in our subsequent analysis we examine the relative contribution of the change in 
firm-effects to a worker’s earnings change across different groups of workers, and we 
will also include other covariates, such as the change in the worker-i's peer average 
earnings, that may affect their earnings change. For instance, it’s possible that the 
coefficients of this equation vary according to the worker’s initial wage level. For 
example, new entrant workers may benefit most from moving to a high-wage firm, 
alternatively they may benefit least if there is segmentation along occupational lines so 
that they do not receive the full firm-premium. 
4.  Data description 
The data that we use for the analysis are from the Statistics New Zealand Linked 
Employer-Employee Database (LEED), which uses information from tax and statistical 
sources to construct a record of paid jobs. Since April 1999, all employers in New 
Zealand are required to file a monthly record with Inland Revenue (IRD) called an 
Employer Monthly Schedule (EMS), which lists all paid employees at that firm during the 
month, the earnings they received and the amount of tax that was deducted at source. 
Two types of recipients are covered by EMS: those who have Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) 
tax deducted, who are employees; and those who pay withholding tax, who are a subset 
of the self-employed. Because the selection and coverage of which self-employed 
workers have tax withheld is unknown, we use only information on PAYE-deducted 
(employee) jobs.
13 We use all the available data on PAYE employee jobs in New 
Zealand during the nine March-years from April 1999 to March 2008. 
Firms (employers) and workers (employees) are identified by unique, confidential 
identifiers based on their IRD tax numbers. For workers, this represents a single 
identifier over time, enabling workers to be tracked longitudinally and across the firms 
that they work for. In the IRD data, employers are identified as the legal or 
administrative unit to which the EMS return relates, and do not equate to any consistent 
conception of a firm. That is, legal and/or other administrative changes can trigger a 
change in an employer’s IRD identifier, with no effective change in the economic 
structure of the firm. Statistics New Zealand has used a range of administrative data to 
identify continuing enterprises even when IRD identifiers change. We use continuing 
enterprises, as defined in the Longitudinal Business Frame (LBF) (Seyb, 2003) as our 
definition of firms. 
                                                  
 
13  In addition to regular firm-worker employment jobs being identified in the LEED, several other 
relationships involving PAYE tax deductions can also be identified by particular “employer” 
identifiers. These are working-age social welfare taxable benefits; earnings-related accident 
compensation payments from the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC); Student 
Allowance payments (SA); Paid Parental Leave (PPL) payments; and New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS) retirement pensions. In what follows, we make a distinction between 
LEED earnings from employment-jobs and other LEED income from these other (non-
employment) sources. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Conceptually, the LEED covers the universe of PAYE employment relationships and 
earnings in New Zealand over the period. In addition, there is limited information on the 
characteristics of workers and firms: age, sex, and location of workers; and industry and 
location of firms. One limitation of the LEED data for the current project is that it 
contains only monthly earnings information, without any measure of monthly hours of 
work. As a result, we cannot accurately distinguish between hourly wages hours worked 
in terms of the variation in earnings. For example, low monthly earnings may be due to 
either a low hourly wage and/or low hours worked. In order to create a proxy for the 
hourly wage rate, we estimate a ‘full-time-equivalent’ (FTE) annual employment 
measure, using information on multiple jobs, monthly earnings, and receipt of income 
from non-employment sources. The algorithm is more fully described in Maré and 
Hyslop (2006, 2008). Annual earnings are divided by FTE to create a FTE earnings rate 
measure, which we convert to constant (2008) dollars, using the CPI. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the balanced sample of worker-year 
observations that is used in the analysis.
14 The analysis is weighted by each worker’s 
previous year’s (lagged) FTE employment.
15 The first row presents the summary 
statistics for the full sample, and subsequent blocks of rows summarise various 
subsamples. The mean log(FTE earnings) is 10.70 (approximately $45,000), and the 
average change in log(FTE earnings) is 0.036. The average age of workers is 38.4 
years, and 46 percent are female. 
We characterise workers as job-stayers if their (FTE-weighted) average firm fixed effect 
is the same in both years, and as job-movers if their average firm effect changes.
 To be 
a job-stayer essentially requires that they work for a single firm in both the current and 
previous year, while movers generally have some different combination of employers in 
each year.
16 Owing to the way that we measure moves, a single job change will 
generally appear as a two-year job-change episode and such job changes will thus 
entail gains that are twice as large as indicated by the annual changes. A little over one-
half (53 percent) of workers are characterised as year-to-year job-stayers. In rows 2 and 
3 of Table 1 we describe the characteristics of the subsamples of movers and stayers. 
On average, stayers’ FTE earnings are about 20 percent higher than movers, and 
stayers are more likely to be male and are about 5 years older, while the log(FTE 
earnings) growth rates are about the same for movers and stayers. 
The next pair of rows presents the characteristics of males and females. Males earn 
more on average (the difference in average log(FTE earnings) is 0.27, about 30 
percent), but have about the same average earnings growth, are slightly younger (0.9 
years), and are more likely to stay in the same job. Table 1 next describes outcomes by 
age group. Not surprisingly, younger workers (aged 20–29) have 25–30 percent (0.25 
log points) lower average earnings than prime aged or older (30–44 or 45–59) workers, 
                                                  
 
14  That is, the sample of paired observations for which a worker worked in consecutive years. 
15  A description of the effects of the balanced sample selection and weighting scheme is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
16  However, there are several ways in which a worker may be classed as a mover, including the 
possibility that they have the same set of (multiple) employers in each year but with the 
relative earnings from each changing over time. A further consequence of defining a worker 
as a job mover based on changing average firm effect between the last and this year is that 
job changes that occur during a year will result in the worker being classified as a mover both 
in that year and the subsequent year. Appendix Table A2 summarises the number of jobs 
held by job-movers and stayers. For job-movers, about one-third have a single job in the 
current year and, of these, two-thirds had 2 jobs in the previous year while 10 percent had 
just 1 job; and nearly one-half (44 percent) had 2 jobs in the current year, of which one-half 
had a single job in the previous year and one-third had 2 jobs. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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but substantially stronger growth (over 6 percent versus 2.8 and 1.8 percent for 30–44 
and 45–59 year olds respectively). Younger workers are also more likely to change jobs 
(62 percent change jobs compared to 54 and 38 percent of the prime aged and older 
workers). While this latter finding may reflect the benefits of moving to better jobs, it may 
also simply reflect different employment patterns over the life cycle. 
The next pair of rows presents the average characteristics of four subsamples defined 
by the quartiles of the estimated worker fixed-effects from the first stage of estimation. 
Unsurprisingly, there is a strong positive earnings gradient across these skill-quartiles. 
In addition, workers in the lower quartiles are substantially more likely to be female and 
movers than in higher quartiles. However, there are not systematic earnings growth 
differences across quartiles or between movers and stayers. 
The final sample stratification in Table 1 is by the pattern of employment transitions 
observed in the LEED data over the nine year sample period. In particular, we define 
“Continuing” workers as those who work in each of the nine years. We define “Entering” 
workers as those who do not work in the first year and make a single transition into 
LEED employment during the period. “Exiting” workers are those who work in the first 
year and make a single transition out of LEED employment during the period, and 
“Miscellaneous” workers are all other workers, who have miscellaneous LEED transition 
experiences. The composition of these groups reflects various life cycle patterns. For 
example, Entrants are predominantly young, with an average age about 6 years 
younger than the overall average, and are more likely to be job-movers; in contrast, 
Continuers are primarily prime aged and less likely to change jobs; the Miscellaneous 
group is also younger and has a greater fraction of females, reflecting the intermittent 
work patterns of women during child-rearing ages. 
5.  Results 
We begin our analysis of the effects of a worker’s job-mobility on their earnings by 
summarising the results of the first-stage estimation.  
5.1.  Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 presents a summary for the full balanced sample, and the same sets of 
subsamples described in Table 1.
17 For each sample, we describe the average log(FTE 
earnings), and estimated firm fixed effects and residual earnings from the first-stage 
regression, the average change in each of these, and the average change from move-
years relative to stay-years over the sample period. As outlined above, residual 
earnings changes reflect tenure-related in-job wage growth (net of life-cycle growth) for 
job-stayers, and a combination of the loss of tenure-related wage premiums and the 
potential for mobility-related wage gains for movers. 
For the full sample, presented in row 1, the contribution to wage growth from changes in 
the estimated firm fixed-effect is 0.002 (0.2 percent), while the average residual change 
is -0.001 (-0.1 percent). Firm-effect changes are associated only with job-moves. Thus, 
column 5 shows that the average firm-effect change associated with job changes is 0.3 
percent per year. The final column in Table 2 shows the average residual change 
associated with annual job-moves versus job-stays. For the full sample, this is -1.6 
percent per year. These latter two results suggest that, on average, job-moves are 
                                                  
 
17  To describe the effects of selection on year-to-year continuing workers, and weighting by 
lagged FTE employment, Appendix table A1 presents summary statistics for all worker-year 
observations, years 2–9 observations, and the balanced sample weighted by 
contemporaneous FTE employment. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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associated with workers moving to better paying firms, but at the cost of losing time-
varying tenure and other residual earnings associated with staying with a firm.
18   
The subsequent rows present analogous results for subsamples. The next two rows (for 
movers and stayers) show that the average -0.016 annual difference in residual 
earnings growth for job-changing versus staying is due to a 0.010 (1.0 percent) fall in 
residual earnings for movers and a 0.006 (0.6 percent) gain in residual earnings for 
stayers. In addition, this panel also shows that movers work for firms with lower fixed 
effects and have negative residual earnings, on average, than job-stayers.  
These patterns of positive firm-effect changes, and negative residual earnings changes, 
for job-movers versus stayers are broadly true across almost all the subgroups 
considered in Table 2.
19 Average firm-effect gains associated with moving are 
particularly strong (1–1.2 percent per annum) for younger (20–29 year old) and 
“Entering” workers, suggesting the importance of “job-shopping” early in a worker’s 
career. These two groups of workers also have smaller residual earnings loss 
associated with moving versus staying relative to the overall sample, which is consistent 
with such workers not having built up much firm-specific tenure. 
One concern with interpreting the changes in firm-effects and residual earnings as 
reflecting causal effects of moving versus staying, is that such changes may simply 
reflect heterogeneity in which workers change jobs. One partial control for this issue is 
to condition on both the number of paired-years observed and the number of move-
years, and compare the changes during years in which workers change jobs with 
changes during years when they don’t change jobs. We have done this for each of the 
LEED sample transition groups, and the results are qualitatively the same as the more 
parsimonious summary presented in the final panel of Table 2. 
In summary, the patterns described here are consistent with workers changing jobs to 
better paying firms, but at the cost of the loss of firm-specific returns to tenure relative to 
workers who stay with the firm. The results imply the average annual returns to an 
additional year of tenure for job-stayers is about 0.6 percent, while the accumulated 
average tenure loss is about 1.6 percent for job-movers. 
5.2.  Regression analysis 
We wish to identify the contribution to wage growth of changes in which firm workers 
work in. Table 3 summarises the relationship between the level of wages and the 
estimated first-stage components, as in equation (1’), as well as the relationship 
between wage changes and changes in components, as in equation (3). 
The first column reports a level regression, weighted using the same (FTE) weights as 
used in the first stage regression. If this regression were run on exactly the same 
sample as the first stage regression, the coefficients on each covariate would be 
                                                  
 
18  These changes for movers may result from one or more job changes. For movers who are 
observed in each year and who make a single job change, the annual change in firm-effect 
associated with moving is 0.4 percent and the corresponding change in transitory earnings is 
-1.4 percent. For this highly selective group, the gains from firm upgrading are larger, and the 
loss in transitory earnings is smaller, than for movers generally. For this group, the overall 
gains from moving accrue for two years, giving gains of 0.8 percent from a higher firm effect 
and a transitory loss of 2.8 percent for the job change episode. 
19  The only exceptions are that the groups of 45–59 year old and “Exiting” workers who move 
jobs lose 0.002 (0.2 percent) in terms of the estimated firm effects. Exiting workers also have 
large (4.4 percent) residual earnings losses from moving versus staying. These patterns may 
reflect aspects of later-career employment changes over the life cycle. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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precisely 1. Thus, the deviations from 1 reflect the non-randomly selected nature of the 
balanced sample.
20 The R-squared for this regression shows the same degree of fit as 
in our first stage estimated regression, with worker demographics, and worker and firm 
fixed effects, and time effects accounting for 91 percent of the cross-sectional variation 
in log wages. 
Next, to provide a sense of the effect of using lagged FTE employment weights, the 
second column contains the results of the regression using these weights. The 
estimated coefficients from this regression are further from 1, except on the 
demographics variable, suggesting that the lagged FTE weights tends to accentuate the 
effects of non-randomness associated with the balanced sample selection. 
The third and fourth columns provide analogous estimates for the regression of annual 
wage change on the change in wage components weighted, respectively, by current 
and lagged FTE employment. The estimated coefficients on the three components 
(estimated firm fixed effects, worker demographics and time effects) are now all less 
than 1, and vary somewhat between the two sets of estimates. The coefficients on the 
change in firm effects are 0.94 (weighted by current FTE employment) and 0.97 
(weighted by lagged FTE employment): the latter implying that workers moving between 
firms gain 97 percent of the difference in firm wage premiums in the year that they 
move. The estimated coefficients on the change in worker demographics and change in 
time effects are both much lower than 1 and more variable across the two columns.  
In our subsequent analysis, in order to provide a more flexible specification when we 
include additional variables, we replace the change in the estimated year effects in the 
earnings-change regressions with separate year dummy variables. Column 5 shows 
that replacing the estimated time effects components with explicit year dummies makes 
no appreciable difference in estimates for the contribution of firm fixed effects or 
demographic components, and the R-squared is also unchanged. 
In the final specification reported in Table 3, we add a dummy variable for whether a 
job-change occurred. For observations where workers move between jobs, wage 
growth is estimated to be 0.013 log points (1.3 percent) lower. This contrasts with the 
higher raw wage growth for movers shown in Table 2. By including the demographic 
effects, the regression estimates control for the fact that younger workers have both 
higher rates of job change and higher rates of wage growth. The estimated coefficients 
on the firm and demographic effects are slightly higher in this specification than those in 
column (5). 
We treat the specification reported in column (6) of Table 3 as the base specification for 
our analysis, and report results that extend this specification in Table 4. These 
extensions examine the possible influence of changing peers (co-workers) on wage 
growth, and whether workers with different abilities benefit differentially from gaining 
jobs with high-paying firms or high-ability peers. We repeat the results for this baseline 
specification in the first column of Table 4. 
For the first extension, which we report in column (2), we add measures of changing 
peer demographics and peer fixed effects, and also the level of the worker’s estimated 
fixed effect. The peer variables are calculated as FTE-weighted averages of the 
demographic and worker fixed effects estimates for co-workers with whom each worker 
                                                  
 
20  Panel B of Appendix table A1 shows the effects on the average estimated components of 
losing the first year due to differencing (column 2) plus non-random balanced sample 
selection (column 3) relative to the full sample used in the first-stage estimation (column 1). 
Column 4 presents the means for the balanced sample weighted by lagged FTE 
employment. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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works in a particular year, using estimates from the first stage regression.
21 Earnings 
growth is higher for workers who have an increase in their average peer fixed effects; 
while the change in peer demographics has a small negative impact on earnings 
growth. We also estimate a positive coefficient on the worker fixed effect, which 
suggests that workers with higher permanent earnings premiums also have higher 
earnings growth on average. For example, a one standard deviation increase in worker 
effect (about 0.35) is associated with about 0.4 percent stronger earnings growth per 
year. The inclusion of these additional covariates also reduces the estimated 
contribution of changing firm fixed effects. Although not reported separately, this 
reduction is largely due to the inclusion of the peer effects covariates rather than the 
worker effect, suggesting that the advantage of moving to a higher paying firm includes 
a benefit of working with ‘better’ co-workers. 
In columns (3) – (6) we report the results of specifications that interact the worker effect 
(and its square in columns (4) and (6)) with the job mover dummy, the change in the 
firm effect, and the change in average peer fixed effects (in columns (5) and (6)). These 
interaction terms generally have significant coefficients, but are individually difficult to 
interpret. For this reason, in Figure 1 we present the estimated coefficients for each of 
the job-mover effect, change in firm fixed effects, and change in peer effects across 
worker effect profiles (ranging from two standard deviations below the mean worker 
effect to two standard deviations above).
22 These profiles are based on the final 
specification reported in Table 4, which includes linear and quadratic worker effect 
interactions with each of these three variables. 
First, the job-mover (mobility) profile for workers is mildly non-linear and negatively 
sloped across the worker effect, implying an increasing earnings penalty associated 
with changing jobs for workers with higher fixed effects. That is, for workers with below-
average to average earnings premiums, the earnings penalty associated with moving 
jobs is around -1 percent; and this penalty increases gradually to about -1.8 percent for 
workers with high earnings premiums. 
Second, the estimated coefficient-profile associated with changing firm effects is 
approximately linear and positively sloped over the range of worker effects presented in 
Figure 1. This is centred on 0.99 for workers with fixed effect zero, and has a slope of 
about 0.3. The estimated relative gain associated with a change in firm effect is 0.6 for a 
worker effect of -0.7 (2 standard deviations below the average), and nearly double that 
(1.19) for a worker effect of 0.7 (2 standard deviations above the average). The 
contribution to a worker’s earnings growth also depends on the size of the change in the 
firm fixed effect. For example, if a worker moves to a firm with a 1 standard deviation 
higher effect (0.09), the contribution to their wage growth is estimated to range from 
about 5.5 percent for low-effect workers to 10.9 percent for high-effect workers. 
Third, the estimated profile associated with the change in average peer fixed effects is 
concave, but mostly increasing over the range of worker effects. The relative 
contribution ranges from -0.02 for low-effect (-0.7) workers to about 0.035 – 0.045 for 
                                                  
 
21  To contribute to the estimation of the impact of peers, a worker must work with at least 1 FTE 
of other workers in the year. The regressions include dummies to absorb the cases where 
the change in peer demographics or peer fixed effects is due to having no peers in either 
year. 
22  In Appendix figure A1(a) we present the fractions of workers who change jobs and the 
average change in peer fixed effects across the range of worker fixed effects; and in 
Appendix figure A1(b) we show the average change in firm fixed effects of movers, and 
average change in peer fixed effects of movers and stayers across the range of worker fixed 
effects. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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average to high-effect (0 – 0.7) workers. Again, expressing these effects in terms of the 
scale of the change in peer effects, the earnings growth for a worker who experiences a 
1 standard deviation (0.08) increase in average peer effects is estimated to range from -
0.2 percent for low-effect workers to 0.3 percent for average to high-effect workers. The 
magnitude of these effects is considerably smaller than those for changes in firm fixed 
effects. 
We estimate the specification reported in column (6) of Table 4, separately for males 
and females, and also separately for 20–29, 30–44 and 45–59 year olds. The 
regression estimates and presented in Table 5, and the analogous coefficient profiles 
across worker effects are shown in Figure 2 for males and females, and in Figure 3 by 
age groups. The estimated mobility and change in firm effects profiles in Figure 2 are 
very similar for males and females; while the estimated peer effects profiles are about 
0.025 higher for males than females. 
The estimated profiles for the three age groups, presented in Figure 3, show somewhat 
different patterns. For mobility, shown in Figure 3(a), the effects are approximately 
linear and declining for prime aged workers (30-44 year olds), are steeper for older (45–
59 year olds), and are weaker and convex for young workers (20–29 year olds) across 
the worker effect range. For older workers the worker effect is likely to be capturing a 
stronger average tenure effect, particularly for higher-effect workers, and the stronger 
negative effect of job change on workers’ earnings likely reflect the loss in such a tenure 
component of their earnings. 
We describe the patterns of the change in firm effects in Figure 3(b). The profiles across 
worker effects are both higher and (slightly) steeper for older workers than younger 
workers, while the profile for prime aged workers lies between the other two but is 
flatter. Thus, for a given change in firm effect associated with a job move, older workers 
tend to capture more of the change in their earnings, while the relative gradient across 
worker effects is similar for older and younger workers. In Figure 3(c) we present the 
profiles of the estimated change peer effect coefficients. The profile for young workers is 
steeper than for prime-aged and older workers. 
All of the results presented above have been from analysis based on the full sample of 
paired-year worker observations. This data potentially confounds the experiences of 
workers who move voluntarily with a view to improving their earnings with the 
experiences of workers who make less systematic moves. In order to examine the 
robustness of our results to these effects, we now select a sample of more stable job 
movers and stayers. In particular, we select a sample of workers with the following 
characteristics: (i) they have at most a single transition into or out of LEED during the 
observation period (that is, they are either “Continuers”, “Entrants”, or “Exiters”, as 
defined above); (ii) they hold multiple jobs in at most one year; and (iii) their firm FE 
(ψj(i)t) either changes at most once if they have a single job in each year, or changes in 
two consecutive years if they have multiple jobs in one year.
23 These criteria select 
workers who have either stable employment with a single firm (job-stayers), or 
experience a single job change. For an additional robustness check, we also select the 
balanced subsample of workers who work in each year of the sample (that is, the 
Continuers). 
In Table 6 we compare the regression results based on all worker-year observations 
(presented in column (1)), with those based on the more selective sample of single job-
                                                  
 
23  Recall that, as discussed above, a typical job change (occurring during a year) will result in a 
change in the Firm FE both in the year of the change and the following year. Workers who 
change jobs between years (so that they hold a single job in each) will have a single change 
in their Firm FE. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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movers and stayers (in column (3)), and the Continuers’ subsample (in column (5)). For 
this exercise, we use the regression specification reported in column (2) of Table 4, and 
our main focus is the estimated effect of moving on workers’ earnings growth. The 
estimated coefficient on the “Mover” dummy variable is similar across the three 
samples, suggesting that moving is associated with an annual fall in earnings of 
between 1.1 percent (for the sample of single movers and stayers) and 1.5 percent (for 
the subsample of Continuing workers).  
To describe how the selected samples differ, we have also reported the means of the 
variables in the even numbered columns of Table 6. By construction, the two selected 
samples have much lower fractions of job-movers (14.9 and 10.0 percent versus 47.3 
percent for the full sample of worker-year observations).
24 In addition, workers in these 
samples also have lower average earnings growth and Firm FE growth, and higher 
average Worker FE (θi) than the overall sample. Each of these differences reflects the 
relative selectivity of prime aged workers with higher worker-specific earnings 
premiums, who are more likely in stable career employment. We suspect this helps 
explain the larger loss in earnings associated with changing jobs for workers among the 
Continuers’ subsample of single movers and stayers: that is, such workers are likely to 
have built up more firm-specific tenure over time, which is lost when changing jobs. 
We also describe the residual earnings change trends over the period for the selected 
sample of single-movers and stayers. First, Figure 4(a) shows the average residual 
earnings change of the subsamples of job-staying Continuers, Entrants, and Exiters. In 
this figure we have aligned the years such that year-0 refers to the first year-change 
observed for Continuers (that is, 1999/2000–2000/01) and for Entrants, and the final 
year-change for Exiters. For Continuers, the average residual change is very small (less 
than 0.7 percent in magnitude in each year), and shows no particular trend. However, 
for Entrants, the average residual change is positive and quite large (3.3 percent) in the 
first year, and declines gradually to about zero in year-4, and then negative in years 5 
and 6. This pattern is consistent with positive tenure effects during the early years of 
employment in a job, although the first year’s change may be confounded by unusual 
LEED-entry effects. For Exiters, somewhat symmetrically, the average residual earnings 
change is small and positive 5 and 6 years before exit, turning negative in the 4 years 
leading up to exit, and a large (9.6 percent) positive change in the exit year. We suspect 
this large final-year change is due to a combination of accumulated leave, redundancy 
and other retirement payments to such workers. 
Next, in Figure 4(b) we present analogous trends in average residual earnings changes 
for single job-moving Continuers, Entrants, and Exiters. In this figure, we have aligned 
the years such that year-0 refers to the year of observed job-change for each worker. 
There are two patterns we want to emphasise from this figure. First, Entrants have 
generally positive but declining residual changes in both their first-job (before year-0) 
and second-job (after year-0), again consistent with positive and declining tenure-
related earnings growth during the early years of a job. The residual changes for 
Entrants are also generally larger in magnitude than those of either Continuers or 
Exiters, except during the final year of employment for Exiters where, again, there is a 
large (8.0 percent) average change. Continuing workers also have positive average 
residual earnings change in the years after a job change (years 2–5), consistent with 
positive but declining tenure-related earnings growth. 
                                                  
 
24  We have also estimated regressions that control for worker fixed effects (rather than the 
estimated Worker FE from the first-stage regression) for these two samples. The estimated 
job-moving effects on workers’ earnings remain negative and are somewhat larger (-1.5 and -
1.8 percent per year for the two samples, or -3.0 percent and -3.6 percent respectively per 
move) than those reported in Table 6. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Second, there are quite striking residual-change patterns in the year of change and the 
following year. For Entrants who change jobs, the average residual change increases in 
year-0, suggesting newer (and younger) workers benefit from changing jobs. However, 
for Continuers and Exiters, the residual change falls in years-0 and 1 (to 0.0 and -2.1 
percent for Continuers and -2.9 and -2.8 percent for Exiters). These patterns are also 
consistent with the loss of tenure-related earnings premiums when workers change 
jobs. Curiously, for both of these groups, the residual earnings change is, on average, 
positive (1.3 percent) in the year prior to a job change. We have no satisfactory 
explanation of this effect. 
Finally, to describe the residual earnings changes around the point of a job-change 
further, in Figure 4(c) we show the pattern of average residual earnings change for all 
single-mover workers around the year of job-change on a smaller scale, and repeat the 
patterns for the job-moving Continuers shown in Figure 4(b). We believe this highlights 
the patterns shown in Figure 4(b). In particular, this shows the declining, and generally 
positive, average residual changes in the years prior to job-change; the saw-tooth 
positive-negative-postive average changes in the three years around a job-change; and 
the declining, and generally positive, changes in the later years. We suspect the year-0 
zero average residual changes may be due to negative tenure-related effects 
associated with job change offsetting positive accumulated leave and redundancy 
payments in the final-year with a firm. 
6.  Concluding discussion 
The paper provides a preliminary analysis of the relationship between workers’ job 
mobility and their annual wage changes using LEED data. Our primary focus has been 
on to what extent workers upgrade their jobs over time by moving to higher paying 
firms, and the extent of the tradeoff between making wage gains from such upgrading 
and the loss of tenure-related earnings associated with changing firms. 
The analysis provides the following tentative contributions. First, we conclude that, 
although job-movers have slightly higher raw annual earnings growth than job-stayers, 
when we control for other factors job-movers have on average lower earnings growth. 
Our estimated penalty associated with job moves depends on the particular regression 
specification: from our base specification the estimate is 1.3 percent per year. These 
results are somewhat larger than Maloney’s (2006) LEED results, which were based on 
a more selective sample of job-movers and stayers, and a somewhat different 
methodology. 
Second, workers who change jobs, on average, gain 0.3 percent per year from moving 
to a firm with a higher firm earnings premium, but lose 1.6 percent per year transitory 
earnings relative to workers who don’t change jobs. For younger workers (aged 20–29) 
and those who enter LEED employment during the period, the extent of moving to better 
firms is larger (1.0 – 1.2 percent on average), while the associated transitory earnings 
losses are smaller (1.2 – 1.3 percent on average). We interpret these findings as being 
due to an earnings growth tradeoff for workers between moving to a higher paying firm 
and losing their tenure-related earnings at their existing firm. Our regression estimates 
also show that, on average, higher ability workers (as measured by higher worker fixed 
effects) and older workers experience greater earnings loss associated with a job move. 
Third, consistent with our first-stage estimation, we estimate that, on average, workers 
gain (almost) all of the change in firm earnings premiums when they change jobs. 
However, such relative gains are not equally shared by all workers. In particular, our 
estimates suggest that it is the higher ability workers who make the greatest income 
gain (or loss) from moving to a firm with a higher (or lower) earnings premium. 
Andersson et al., (2005) emphasise the importance to low-paid workers of moving to a 
higher paying firm. We find that, while all workers appear to gain from a move to better Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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paying firms, higher ability workers benefit relatively more. We also estimate that older 
workers tend to receive more of the change in firm effects than younger workers. 
Finally, we find that workers’ earnings also benefit on average from a change in the 
average earnings premium of their co-workers. Controlling for other factors, we estimate 
that a 1 standard deviation change in the average peer effect provides about 0.25 
percent change in a worker’s earnings on average. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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8.  Appendix 1 
In this appendix we describe the selection and weighting effects in terms of the sample 
characteristics of the analysis sample versus wider population samples in the data. The 
first stage estimation of the log(FTE earnings) equations are weighted by 
contemporaneous FTE employment, while our second stage analysis examines year-to-
year wage dynamics and is weighted by workers’ lagged FTE employment. Appendix 
table A1 compares descriptive statistics of the balanced sample weighted by each 
worker’s previous year’s (lagged) FTE employment (column 4) as used in the analysis, 
and three samples weighted by workers’ contemporaneous FTE employment (columns 
1–3). These samples are the full sample of worker-year observations in all years 
(column 1) and the full sample of worker-year observations in years 2–9 (column 2), and 
the balanced subsample of observations for workers who also worked in the previous 
year (column 3).  
Over the 9 years of the sample period, there are 18.4 million total worker-year 
observations (a little over 2 million per year on average) and FTE employment of 12.6 
million workers (about 1.4 million per year). Dropping the first year observations (for 
comparability with the balanced sample), there are 16.6 million observations and FTE 
employment of 11.4 million. Of these, 14.5 million (FTE employment of 10.9 million) also 
had observations in the previous year, which represents a match rate of 88 percent of 
workers, and 95 percent of FTE employment. 
A comparison of columns (2) and (3) shows that workers observed in consecutive years 
on average have higher earnings and are older than other workers in the sample. The 
year-to-year growth in the average log(FTE earnings) over the period for the full sample 
is 0.015 (1.5 percent) per year. In contrast, the average balanced sample log(FTE 
earnings) growth shown in Appendix table A1 is 0.056. The difference between these 
two averages is due partly to experience related wage-growth associated with ageing in 
the balanced sample, and partly to a selection effect of workers with lower than average 
initial year log(FTE earnings) and stronger wage growth being over represented in the 
balanced sample. For example, older workers, who have higher-earnings but lower 
earnings growth on average, will contribute to this latter selection effect because they 
are more likely to retire and so not be in the balanced sample. 
The mean log(FTE earnings) of the balanced sample weighted by each worker’s lagged 
FTE employment in column (4) are 1–3 percent higher than in column (3), while the 
average change in log(FTE earnings) is lower (0.036 versus 0.056) implying that 
workers with higher earnings and lower growth on average worked more in the previous 
year than current year. 
Second, in panel B of Appendix table A1, we compare the averages of the various 




Sample  Log 
(FTE Earn) 
Change in log 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
              
All 10.695  0.036  0.462  38.40 0.527  14,506,400  10,602,400 
Movers 10.586  0.037  0.488  35.75 0.000 7,702,700 5,016,600 
Stayers 10.793  0.036  0.439  40.78 1.000 6,803,700 5,585,800 
Males 10.818  0.037  0.000  37.99 0.550 7,379,400 5,705,100 
Females 10.552  0.036  1.000  38.88 0.500 7,127,000 4,897,300 
Age group: 
20-29 10.535  0.064  0.450  24.70 0.378 3,368,200 2,282,200 
30-44 10.789  0.028  0.451  37.09 0.540 5,125,800 4,063,600 
45-59 10.785  0.018  0.496  51.17 0.618 3,767,300 3,159,100 
Worker fixed-effects Quartiles: 
1 (Lowest)  10.276  0.025  0.722  41.46 0.474 4,449,900 2,650,600 
2 10.527  0.038  0.499  35.92 0.463 3,761,600 2,650,600 
3 10.733  0.044  0.361  35.65 0.524 3,385,600 2,650,600 
4 (Highest)  11.245  0.038  0.266  40.56 0.646 2,909,200 2,650,600 
LEED Sample Transitions: 
Continuers 10.757  0.030  0.459  40.48 0.559 8,141,000 6,909,600 
Entrants 10.545  0.073  0.459  32.11 0.430 2,937,300 1,614,900 
Exiters 10.653  0.024  0.467  37.99 0.529 1,714,200 1,234,400 
Miscellaneous 10.539  0.037  0.487 33.96 0.447 1,713,900  843,500 
Notes: Based on LEED data from 1999/2000 – 2007/08. All means are weighted by lagged FTE employment. Earnings in constant (2008) $-values. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Table 2 
Summary of Mover versus Stayer Earnings and Firm-effects changes 
  Levels  Changes  Move - Stay Changes 
Sample  Log 
(FTE Earn) 
Firm 
effect  Residual  Log 
(FTE Earn) 
Firm 
effect  Residual  Log 
(FTE Earn) 
Firm 
effect  Residual 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) 
                
All 10.695  0.003  -0.002  0.036  0.002 -0.001 0.001  0.003  -0.016 
Movers 10.586  -0.014  -0.013  0.037  0.003  -0.010  …  …  … 
Stayers 10.793  0.018  0.008  0.036  0.000  0.006  …  …  … 
Males 10.818  0.020  -0.001  0.037  0.001 0.000 0.002  0.003  -0.016 
Females 10.552  -0.018  -0.003  0.036 0.002 -0.003 0.002  0.004  -0.015 
Age group: 
20-29 10.535  -0.006  -0.004  0.064  0.006 -0.009 0.001  0.010  -0.013 
30-44 10.789  0.020  -0.003  0.028  0.000 -0.001 -0.011  0.001  -0.012 
45-59 10.785  0.003  0.001  0.018  -0.001 -0.001 -0.019  -0.002  -0.017 
Worker fixed-effects Quartiles: 
1 (Lowest)  10.276  -0.037  -0.006  0.025 0.001  -0.004  -0.005  0.002  -0.013 
2 10.527  -0.005  -0.006  0.038  0.003 -0.008 0.008  0.005  -0.015 
3 10.733  0.009  -0.001  0.044  0.002 -0.002 0.012  0.005  -0.012 
4 (Highest)  11.245  0.045  0.007  0.038  0.000 0.008 -0.008  0.000  -0.017 
LEED Sample Transitions: 
Continuers 10.757 0.012  -0.001  0.030  0.001 -0.002 -0.002  0.002  -0.012 
Entrants 10.545  -0.023  0.002  0.073 0.007 0.007 0.025  0.012  -0.008 
Exiters 10.653  0.002  -0.005  0.024  -0.001 -0.005 -0.030  -0.002  -0.044 
Miscellaneous 10.539 -0.021  -0.009 0.037 0.002  -0.009  -0.007  0.003  -0.023 
Notes: All estimates are weighted by lagged FTE employment. The difference between a “Move” and “Stay” change is calculated as the difference between the average 
change of move-year observations and the average of stay-year observations. “Continuing” workers work in each of the 9 years; “Entering” workers make a single transition 
into LEED employment; “Exiting” workers make a single transition out of LEED employment; “Miscellaneous” workers are all other workers. Changes are annual changes. A 
consequence of our definition of job change is that a job change is generally captured as a two-year job change episode (see text). The change associated with a job change 
is therefore obtained by doubling the change entries in the table.  Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Table 3 
Regressions of log(FTE Earnings) change, all workers 
 Levels  Changes 





Weights  Lag(FTE) weights 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
Firm FE  1.016  1.035  0.938  0.965  0.965  0.967 
 (.0003)  (.0002)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001) 
Demographics 0.987  0.995  0.916  0.781  0.779  0.814 
 (.0003)  (.0002)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001) 
Time effects  0.998  0.978  0.814  0.863  …  … 
 (.001)  (.001)  (.004)  (.005)     
Worker FE  1.007  1.012  …  …  …  … 
 (.0003)  (.0002)         
Mover …  …  …  …  …  -0.013 
           (.0001) 
            
Year controls  N  N  N  N  Y  Y 
Young/old controls  N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y 
            
R-squared 0.910  0.880  0.144  0.116  0.116  0.117 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions in columns 1 and 3 are estimated using 
FTE employment weights; all other regressions are estimated using lag(FTE employment) weights. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Table 4 
Regressions of log(FTE Earnings) change 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
Firm  FE  0.967 0.958 0.964 0.991 0.963 0.988 
  (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Demographics  0.814 0.811 0.811 0.817 0.812 0.817 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Mover  -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
  (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Peer  demographics … -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
    (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Peer  FE  …  0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.035 
    (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Worker  FE  …  0.011 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 
    (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) 
Worker  FE  *        
   Mover  …  …  -0.008  -0.004  -0.008  -0.005 
      (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) 
   Firm FE  …  …  0.307  0.410  0.300  0.395 
      (.007) (.005) (.007) (.005) 
   Peer FE  …  …  …  …  0.009  0.041 
       (.004)  (.003) 
Worker  FE-squared  … … …  0.005  …  0.005 
       (.001)  (.001) 
Worker  FE  squared  *        
   Mover  …  …  …  -0.005  …  -0.005 
       (.001)  (.001) 
   Firm FE  …  …  …  -0.180  …  -0.171 
       (.008)  (.008) 
   Peer FE  …  …  …  …  …  -0.048 
        ( . 0 0 5 )  
        
Year  controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Peer  controls  N Y Y Y Y Y 
Young/old  controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
        
R-squared  0.117 0.117 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using lag(FTE employment) weights. All covariates are in changes, 
except for the Mover dummy variable and worker fixed effects. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Table 5 
Regressions of log(FTE Earnings) change, by Sex and Age 
 By  Sex  By  Age 
 Male  Female  20-29  30-44  45-59 
       
Firm  FE  0.999 0.980 0.910 1.000 1.120 
  (.002) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.005) 
Demographics  0.866 0.772 1.006 0.392 0.949 
  (.002) (.002) (.006) (.016) (.021) 
Mover  -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.017 
  (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.0003) 
Peer demographics  0.000  0.005 -0.019 0.000 0.022 
  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) 
Peer  FE  0.046 0.026 0.034 0.024 0.034 
  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) 
Worker  FE  0.017 0.003 0.063 0.008 -0.014 
  (.0005) (.0005) (.0007) (.0004) (.0005) 
Worker FE *           
   Mover  -0.002  -0.007  0.001  -0.006  -0.015 
  (.0007) (.0006) (.0010) (.0005) (.0006) 
   Firm FE  0.323  0.398  0.388  0.303  0.485 
  (.008) (.010) (.010) (.007) (.013) 
   Peer FE  0.030  0.029  0.067  0.016  0.027 
  (.006) (.004) (.007) (.005) (.005) 
WFE-squared -0.005  0.013 0.004 0.016 0.014 
  (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
WFE-squared  *       
   Mover  -0.009  -0.002  0.032  0.004  -0.001 
  (.001) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.001) 
   Firm FE  -0.112  -0.276  -0.166  -0.195  -0.246 
  (.009) (.027) (.038) (.014) (.017) 
   Peer FE  -0.044  -0.054  -0.062  -0.035  -0.043 
  (.008) (.007) (.018) (.011) (.007) 
       
Year  dummies  Y Y Y Y Y 
Peer  controls  Y Y Y Y Y 
Young/old  dummy  Y Y Y Y Y 
       
R-squared  0.131 0.105 0.139 0.098 0.093 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using lag(FTE employment) weights. All covariates are in changes, 
except for the Mover dummy variable and worker fixed effects. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Table 6 
Regressions of log(FTE Earnings) change 
  All Observations  Maximum 1 job change Balanced sample 
 Regression  Means  Regression  Means  Regression  Means 
            
Log(FTE earnings)  …  0.0363 …  0.0315  … 0.0233 
   change             
Firm FE  0.958  0.0016  1.061  0.0006  1.110  -0.0001 
 (.001)    (.001)    (.008)   
Demographics 0.811  0.0132  0.735  0.0045  0.835  0.0007 
 (.001)    (.003)    (.006)   
Mover -0.012  0.4732  -0.011  0.1485  -0.015  0.1007 
 (.0001)    (.0003)    (.0004)   
Peer demographics -0.002  0.0018  -0.018 0.0007 -0.062  0.0003 
 (.001)    (.003)    (.004)   
Peer FE  0.026  -0.0040 0.025  -0.0065  -0.006  -0.0072 
 (.001)    (.002)    (.003)   
Worker FE  0.011  0.0059  0.011  0.0842  0.007  0.1131 
 (.0002)    (.0003)    (.0003)   
            
Year controls  Y  …  Y  …  Y  … 
Peer controls  Y  …  Y  …  Y  … 
Young/old controls  Y  …  Y  …  Y  … 
            
R-squared 0.117  …  0.066  …  0.063  … 
No. Observations  14,506,400 4,804,500  2,806,200 
Total lag(FTE emp)  10,602,400  3,918,600  2,614,400 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using lag(FTE employment) weights. All covariates are in changes, 
except for the Mover dummy variable and worker fixed effects. 
 Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 









-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7















































-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
















































-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7




































 Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
  29









 All  years  Years  2-9  Balanced  Balanced 
 sample  sample  sample  sample 
        
A:  Summary of raw characteristics 
log(FTE Earn)  10.665  10.670  10.684  10.695 
lag log(FTE Earn)  10.628
(1) 10.628
(1) 10.628 10.659 
log(FTE Earn) change Δyit 0.056
(1) 0.056
(1) 0.056  0.036 
Female 0.462  0.462  0.463  0.462 
Age(2) 38.78  38.89  39.08  39.43 
Job mover  …  …  0.487  0.473 
        




itβ)  0.000 0.000  0.005  0.015 
Time effects (τt)  0.000 0.009  0.009  0.009 
Worker effects (θi)  0.000 -0.003  0.001  0.001 
Firm effects (ψj)  0.000 -0.001  0.002  0.003 
Residual (εit) 
0.000 0.000  0.002  -0.002 
Peer demographics  0.002 0.002  0.004  0.005 
Peer worker effects  0.006 0.003  0.005  0.006 
        
Worker-year Obs  18,377,700  16,553,800 14,506,400  14,506,400 
Worker-year FTE  12,614,800  11,375,800 10,862,600  10,602,400 
Notes: Based on LEED data from 1999/2000 – 2007/08. Earnings in constant (2008) $-values. 
(1) Mean over balanced sample of workers with previous year jobs. 
(2) Average age of those aged 18-64 years. 
(3) All estimates expressed relative to full sample (column 1) means for each component. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Appendix table A2 
Number of Jobs by Mover / Stayer Characteristic 
  Full sample  Balanced sample 
No.  FTE weighted  FTE weighted  lag_FTE weighted 
Jobs Movers  Stayers Total Movers Stayers Total Movers  Stayers Total 
                
1  42.64 99.98 67.98  34.54 99.98 68.13 35.52  99.98 69.48 
2  38.58 0.02  21.54  44.06 0.02 21.46  43.89  0.02 20.78 
3  12.17 0 6.79  13.89 0 6.76  13.44 0 6.36 
4  4.06 0 2.26  4.63 0  2.25  4.41 0  2.09 
5  1.43 0 0.8  1.63 0  0.79  1.54 0  0.73 
6+ 1.12 0 0.62  1.26 0  0.61  1.19 0  0.56 
                
All  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 100  100 
Notes: Total FTE employment of the full sample is 12.6 million, the balanced sample is 10.9 million; and 





Appendix table A3 
Distributions of Movers and Stayers by year 
  Full sample  Balanced sample  Balanced sample 
  FTE weighted  FTE weighted  lag(FTE) weighted 
Year Movers  Stayers Movers  Stayers Movers  Stayers 
            
1 17.60  0  0  0  0  0 
2 9.47  10.80  11.53  10.80  11.57  10.82 
3 9.67  11.18  11.76  11.18  11.77  11.15 
4 9.90  11.74  12.01  11.74  11.96  11.69 
5 10.09  12.39  12.22  12.39  12.16  12.35 
6 10.47  12.87  12.69  12.87  12.57  12.84 
7 10.89  13.19  13.23  13.19  13.20  13.16 
8 10.92  13.63  13.29  13.63  13.45  13.71 
9 10.99  14.21  13.27  14.21  13.31  14.28 
            
Total 55.8  44.2  48.67  51.33  47.32 52.68 
Notes: Total FTE employment of the full sample is 12.6 million, the balanced sample is 10.9 million; and 
lag(FTE) weighted employment of the balanced sample is 10.6 million. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Appendix table A4 
Sample characteristics 
    By Worker FE quartile 
 Mean  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
          
log(FTE Earn)  10.695  10.272  10.522  10.726  11.237 
log(FTE Earn) change  0.036  0.025  0.038  0.044  0.038 
Female 0.462  0.726  0.503  0.364  0.267 
Age 39.43  42.33  36.96  36.87  41.55 
Job stayer  0.527  0.474 0.463 0.522 0.644 
Worker-year Obs  14,506,400  4,358,300 3,750,100 3,415,000 2,983,100 
Worker-year FTE  10,602,400  2,587,800 2,639,000 2,661,600 2,714,000 
 Movers 
log(FTE Earn)  10.586  10.255  10.462  10.648  11.153 
log(FTE Earn) change  0.037  0.023  0.041  0.051  0.033 
Female 0.488  0.718  0.501  0.371  0.298 
Age 36.70  40.65  34.03  33.67  38.94 
Worker-year Obs  7,702,700  2,506,100 2,258,300 1,815,500 1,122,800 
Worker-year FTE  5,016,600  1,360,600 1,418,400 1,272,400  965,300 
 Stayers 
log(FTE Earn)  10.793  10.290  10.592  10.797  11.284 
log(FTE Earn) change  0.036  0.028  0.034  0.038  0.040 
Female 0.439  0.734  0.505  0.357  0.250 
Age 41.89  44.23  40.37  39.76  42.99 
Worker-year Obs  6,803,700  1,852,100 1,491,800 1,599,500 1,860,300 
Worker-year FTE  5,585,800  1,227,200 1,220,600 1,389,300 1,748,700 
Notes: Based on LEED data from 1999/2000 – 2007/08. All means are weighted by lagged FTE 
employment. Earnings in constant (2008) $-values. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Appendix table A5 






















            
Lag(FTE employment) weighted 
Balanced 10.695  0.015  0.009  0.006  0.003  -0.002 
  Expressed relative to row 1 means 
Movers -0.109  -0.029  -0.001  -0.052  -0.017  -0.011 
Stayers 0.098  0.026  0.001  0.046  0.015  0.010 
  Quartile 1 Worker fixed-effects 
All workers  -0.423  0.049  0.003 -0.430 -0.041  -0.005 
Movers -0.440  0.044  0.002  -0.423  -0.053  -0.010 
Stayers -0.405  0.054  0.004  -0.437  -0.028  0.001 
  Quartile 2 Worker fixed-effects 
All workers  -0.173  -0.028  0.002 -0.134 -0.008  -0.005 
Movers -0.233  -0.062  0.001  -0.134  -0.023  -0.015 
Stayers -0.103  0.011  0.003  -0.133  0.009  0.007 
  Quartile 3 Worker fixed-effects 
All workers  0.031  -0.043  0.000  0.067  0.006  0.001 
Movers -0.047  -0.090  -0.001  0.064  -0.009  -0.012 
Stayers 0.102  0.000  0.001  0.070  0.018  0.012 
  Quartile 4 Worker fixed-effects 
All workers  0.542  0.023  -0.005  0.474  0.042  0.008 
Movers 0.457  -0.003  -0.008  0.442  0.032  -0.006 
Stayers 0.588  0.037  -0.004  0.492  0.047  0.016 
Notes: Earnings quartiles are defined based on worker fixed effects. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Appendix table A6 


























                    
All years  10.665  10.665  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.462  37.41  18,377,700
(1) 12,614,800
(1) 
                    
Relative to full sample average: 
1999/2000 10.614  -0.002  -0.080  0.026  0.006 0.000  0.462  36.58  1,823,900  1,239,100 
2000/01 10.612  -0.001  -0.078  0.022  0.005 0.000  0.462  36.85  1,863,300  1,268,600 
2001/02 10.627  0.001  -0.055  0.014  0.003  0.000 0.462 37.19 1,910,000 1,304,100 
2002/03 10.634  0.002  -0.040  0.007  0.000  0.000 0.462 37.38 1,971,700 1,351,700 
2003/04 10.661  0.002  -0.004  0.000  -0.002 0.000  0.462  37.50  2,038,200  1,401,100 
2004/05 10.676  0.000  0.020  -0.005 -0.002 0.000  0.461  37.54  2,112,300  1,454,200 
2005/06 10.689  -0.001  0.040  -0.011 -0.002 0.000  0.462  37.64  2,176,400  1,501,500 
2006/07 10.703  0.000  0.058  -0.016 -0.002 0.000  0.463  37.79  2,219,100  1,528,800 
2007/08 10.736  0.000  0.098  -0.024 -0.003 0.000  0.463  37.91  2,262,800  1,565,700 
                    
1999/2000 – 2007/08 Change: 
 0.122  0.002  0.179  -0.050  -0.008 0.000  0.001  1.33  24.1%  26.4% 
Notes: Based on LEED data from 1999/2000 – 2007/08. Earnings in constant (2008) $-values. Analysis weighted by contemporaneous FTE employment. 
(1) Total worker-year observations, and annual FTE employment over the period. Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics 
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Appendix figure A1 
Job mobility and changes in Firm and Peer effects across workers 
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